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33]

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TO THE KING.

On the Maritime War against France.

LETTER I.

SIR ;

When every eye in the nation, at the end of sixteen years of a war which has given rise to the Income Tax, which has caused a part of every man's estate to be alienated under the name of Redemption of Land-tax, which has banished guineas from the land and made Bank-notes a legal tender, which has seen the Habeas Corpus or Personal Safety Act for many years suspended, which has drained the kingdom of its youth and its vigour, leaving the next generation to be the offspring of decrepitude, deformity and imbecility, which has thus entailed upon the nation ugliness and weakness and disease, and which, while it has robbed the land of thousands upon thousands of the best of its labourers in order to convert them into defenders of Sicily and other foreign countries, has introduced thousands upon thousands of foreigners to defend this same land ; at such a time, when every eye in the nation is anxiously fixed upon the great, and, in all probability, the last, attempt, about to be made against the enemy, it appears to me, that it may be useful publicly to state certain facts, relating to the mode of carrying on a war of such wearisome length and such desolating consequence ; and that this statement may, from its manner, lose none of its intrinsic importance, I, for the second time in my life, presume to address myself directly to your Majesty, taking care, that in this instance, no keeper of official papers shall, as in a recent one, have it in his power to garble, or to suppress, any part of that which I write.

That your Majesty is not well informed as to the great and interesting matters, upon which I am addressing you, I, without the smallest hesitation, conclude ; first, because the measures of your servants, through whom your information must come, are, in no wise, calculated for the real state of things ; and, secondly, because, supposing those servants to possess both talents and zeal sufficient for all the

purposes of their respective stations, their time has, from the moment they entered those offices, been almost wholly engrossed by endeavours to defend themselves, and to annoy and degrade their own political enemies and your Majesty's late servants. As men may be blinded by too much light, so a people may be kept in error, may be deceived and ruined, by the means of the press, which, unperturbed, is so well calculated to insure the constant triumph of truth ; and, I have, for my part, no doubt, that, with all our parade of publicity, with all our ostentation of unreserve, there is, in the whole world, no people, who, in proportion to their magnitude, understand so little of their public affairs as is understood by the people of this kingdom. Were not this the case, Sir, it would be impossible, that the enemy should be in his present flourishing state, with respect to his internal and other resources, while England possesses such means of cutting off those resources.

The general opinion, in this country, is, that France is in a miserable state ; that the people are starving ; and, that, as to commerce, there is no more of it going on in the dominions of Napoleon, than upon any of the islets in the Thames about Windsor or Hampton Court. This, too, I conclude to be the opinion of your Majesty ; because, as I before observed, your information, as to such matters, must be derived from your servants, and those servants prove, by their express declarations as well as by their conduct, that such is their view of the situation of the empire of France. As to whether the subjects of Napoleon like, or dislike, his government ; or, whether they be better or worse off now than they were under their former sovereigns ; these are questions, which we can discuss to no profit, because we possess no facts whereon to reason ; but, with regard to the commerce of France, and that sort of commerce which is the only valuable one, I possess, from the best possible source, quite a sufficiency of facts to shew, that, upon that subject, at least, this has been the most deceived of nations, and your Majesty the most deceived of sovereigns.

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The sort of commerce, to which I allude, is what we, in England, call the *coasting trade*; but, in the dominions of Napoleon, or countries under his sway, it is to be considered as something much more important than it is with us. There is no doubt, that the trade between *London* and the *coal-mines* is of a million times more value to England than all her foreign commerce put together. But, if we cast our eye over the map of Europe, we shall see, that the coasting trade of Napoleon embraces *climates*; and that a maritime communication between his several countries must be, not only of vast benefit to him, but in some cases, necessary to the existence of the people. Some of these countries must supply the others with *corn*. Without the oil and the wine and the silks and the cotton these countries *might* exist; but the southern countries could not, in many cases, possibly exist without the necessaries of life from the North; and of carrying on this commerce there are no means other than those of a maritime nature.

The extent of this commerce, in the dominions of Napoleon, is scarcely to be credited by those, who are not acquainted with the facts. Along the coasts of Naples, Tuscany, Genoa and Piedmont; from the Southern Provinces of France and Marseilles, through Cette, and the grand canal of Louis XIV., to Bourdeaux, and thence along the Atlantic coasts of France, the whole of the coasts of Holland, and into the Elbe; in short, from the Baltic to the southern point of Italy, all the countries are connected by a chain of commercial intercourse as complete, perhaps, as ever existed in the world, and as advantageous as it is extensive. This commerce is, by your Majesty's servants, spoken of under the degrading appellation of "a mere *coasting trade*;" but, this is precisely that trade, which is *really* advantageous to a nation. If England were cut off from all communication with foreign nations, she would, in point of strength and of happiness, suffer nothing at all. But, cut off the communication between London and the coal-mines, and the inhabitants of London must perish or disperse. There are several branches of our coasting trade, of a degree of importance, not, indeed, approaching nearly to this; but, still of greater importance to us, than all our foreign commerce put together. If, for instance, only one year's interruption were to take place in the exchange of *coals* for *timber*

between Cumberland on the one part, and Hampshire and Sussex on the other part, the woods of these latter counties must be burnt to keep the people from perishing, whereas by the exchange now going on, these woods are preserved, the people have fuel in plenty, and that fuel, after having given comfort in that capacity, becomes a valuable manure for the land. One year's interruption of this exchange would do England more harm than would be done by the sinking of all foreign countries to the bottom of the sea. This is, however, only one instance out of hundreds which might be enumerated; and, without any thing more being said, it must, I think, be as clear as the sun at noon day, that, if the enemy were able to put a stop to our coasting trade, it might be at once asserted, that he had it in his power to reduce us to his own terms, be they what they might. Is it not, then, worth the while of your Majesty's servants; is it not worth the while of those, who are entrusted with the conducting of the war, to enquire what is the extent of the coasting trade of the French empire, and to inform themselves as to the means of destroying, or, at least, interrupting that trade? To attack, or to oppose, Napoleon in Spain, Naples, Sicily, Sweden, Denmark, Hanover, or in the East or West Indies, is what it would be for an enemy to attack us in Nova Scotia, Canada, or in any of our colonies, where, though a defeat might produce mortification, it would not seriously affect us, either in our comforts or in the sources of our national strength. We should regret the loss of Canada, perhaps, or of a West India island; but, the loss, like that of a child out of a numerous family, would not be felt in our affairs. We should still be as rich and as strong as before; but, cut off the means of sending corn and timber and iron and tin and coal along our coasts, from one part of the kingdom to the other, and the distress is instantly felt. In fact, the different parts of this kingdom can no more dispense with the coasting trade, than the farmer can dispense with the aid of the blacksmith and the wheelwright.

This, it will, perhaps, be said, is not the case with the countries under the dominion of Napoleon. But, will it, then, be asserted, that those countries, though extending almost across the whole of the European continent, and including such a variety of climates, are, nevertheless, so

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circumstanced as to be able to exist, and contentedly too, without any commerce with each other; that is to say, without any exchange of natural productions, or of manufactures? The truth is, however, that the commerce between the several parts of this vast empire is so great, that convoys of *eighty, a hundred, and even of two hundred sail*, are frequently seen and by your Majesty's fleets too, carrying on this trade in perfect security. These consist chiefly of *Luggers, or Zebecks*, of a light draught of water, from eighty to a hundred and twenty tons burthen, and are navigated by a proportionate number of seamen. There are employed in this commerce, from the river of Bourdeaux alone, *thirty three thousand seamen* and upwards. The coasts of the Mediterranean teem with this commerce. Its ports and bays swarm with vessels; and, at no time was the commerce so great between France and Italy on the one side, and between France and Holland and the North, on the other side, as it is at this moment, while your Majesty's servants are boasting, that they have a navy which scours the ocean, and that "England engrosses the commerce of the world." While they amuse themselves and the nation with this empty vaunting, the commerce of France, and her vassal states, carried on almost within the reach of the naked eye of our admirals, far exceeds, in the means of contributing towards national strength, the commerce of England and of all her allies. The general persuasion here, is, that all the people, under the sway of France, are suffering from causes almost similar to those which affect the inhabitants of a besieged town; that the people of the North can get no wine or oil, and that those of the South can get no corn; that there are no materials to make goods of any sort, that all is decay and misery, and that, *surely*, the poor, beggared, pinched people must, *surely*, they must soon be pushed to desperation; must revolt, and must tear Napoleon and his government to morsels. This has been the expectation for years, in like manner as, for years before, Mr. Pitt and the foreign pensioner Sir Francis D' Ivernois kept alive the constant expectation, that France would become a *bankrupt*, and would then be compelled to submit to her enemies. As the nation was deceived then, so it is deceived now; and so, I greatly fear, it will continue to be deceived, until a knowledge and a belief of the truth will come

too late. One thing, indeed, has staggered many of even the credulous part of the nation; and that is the fact of France being able still to renew her squadrons and her maritime expeditions. For, this astonishing power of creating a maritime force is altogether incompatible with the assertions of your Majesty's servants respecting the ruined state of the commerce of France. The commerce of France being "*annihilated*," we cannot help wondering that the ports of Brest and Rochefort should be continually sending forth their squadrons; we cannot help being surprized and somewhat vexed at seeing a squadron of ten or twelve sail of the line come out of the ports of France, in the space of a few months after we have been congratulated upon the destruction of the *last* of the enemy's ships. The fleet in Basque Roads is said, by the prints of your Majesty's servants, to have been worth *several millions of pounds sterling*, and that the Calcutta alone was worth six hundred thousand pounds, being full of military and naval stores. To have effected the destruction of the whole of this fleet would have been a subject of great joy; to have effected the destruction of part of it was a subject of joy; but, in our haste to express such joy, we forgot to ask, how all these stores came to be found in the port of Rochefort, so many years after we had "*so completely annihilated the commerce of France*," agreeably to the ten-thousand-times-repeated assurances of your Majesty's servants. The fact is, that, not only from the Elbe and the Scheldt are the ports of France supplied, by the means of the coasting trade, with an abundance of naval stores, but also from that part of Spain lying near the Atlantic coast, whence they receive iron, pitch, tar, rosin and ship-timber, of various sorts, and in vast quantities, and at a rate much cheaper than some of these articles can possibly be brought to the arsenals at Portsmouth or Plymouth. If this be the case, and I scruple not to assert that it is the case, what are we doing? What is the *use* which your Majesty's servants are making of the immense means, which the industry and patience of your people put into their hands? If there be a commerce, such as I have described, carried on between the different parts of the dominions of Napoleon, of *what use*, as the means of keeping him in check, are the thousand ships of war, now employed? Of what use is it, if this commerce is to go on un-

interrupted; of what use is it, that the sea is covered with your Majesty's ships, and that history will record the valour of your seamen? Of what avail is it, that we destroy French ships of war, while we leave, in full vigour, all the means of creating others to supply their place? If this be the way of making war, it must be clear to every one, that we can never have peace, without being exposed to imminent danger; for, it will require but a short space of time, for France to raise a navy equal, in numbers at least, to any that we can possess.

The security of this extensive and most valuable commerce of the French dominions arises, in great part, from the use of land signals, or telegraphs, so constructed, placed, and managed as to keep the vessels upon the coast at all times correctly informed of what is passing upon the whole line of coast. From Flushing to Bayonne a report is exchanged *four times a-day*; at day-light, ten o'clock in the forenoon, two o'clock, and just before sunset. So that, at Flushing, they know, four times during the day, what is passing at sea, within sight of the highest hill in the neighbourhood of Bayonne, and, of course, they are informed of what is passing near all the intermediate parts of the coast. The same system is established along the coast of the Mediterranean, from the Gulph of Spezzia to Rosas. The coasting vessels, thus instructed how to move; thus kept constantly in a state of perfect knowledge as to the situation of our fleets or cruizers, and able to sail in safety, carry on their trade in as much security as if those ships were not in existence; and this only, as I shall hereafter prove to your Majesty, from causes which prevent the necessary exertions from being made, and which causes may instantly and easily be removed.

The advantages to the *nations* (for they are many), which carry on this commerce, are not greater than they are to Napoleon himself, in his views of conquest and dominion. From this commerce, notwithstanding our opinions to the contrary, he derives no small part of his revenue, through the means of a stamp-tax, imposed upon every article exported or imported; and hence he is able to dispense with *direct taxes*, which are always odious, and which are, indeed, those which have uniformly ended in exciting the feelings and producing the acts, under which so many governments have perished. This is a great

point. By the means of this commerce, he disguises from his people the burdens which they bear. It is, indeed, a gross imposition to tell a people, that *commerce* pays taxes, the fact being, that those taxes still fall upon the people themselves; but, as your Majesty must have observed, it is an imposition, it is a fraud, it is an act of duplicity and knavery, the success of which in *other countries* warrants the belief that it must be greatly useful to your Majesty's implacable and powerful enemy. Very much, then, are your Majesty's servants deceived, when they suppose, that the Emperor Napoleon has no Custom-house, whereat to collect duties. His scale, indeed, may not be so noble as to afford him Counts and Dukes for receivers; he may not have Marquises for collectors, Barons for wharfingers, and Knights of the Eagle for wine-tasters; but, I am of opinion, that his Custom-house yields him a much greater *clear* revenue than is derived from any similar establishment in the world, and that it affords him the means of drawing upon other sources of taxation with so sparing a hand, that his people, especially within the ancient boundaries of France, have reason to congratulate themselves upon the comparative lightness of their burthens. A great many of your Majesty's subjects, including some in high stations, have, at different times, expressed their astonishment, and, indeed, their vexation, that the people of France should be so slow in *rebelliing* against their Emperor, with whom your Majesty made a treaty of peace and "*amity*" only about seven or eight years go; but, if they had been informed of the facts here stated, relative to the commerce of France, and especially relative to the revenue yielded by that commerce, together with the relief thereby given to all the other sources of taxation, itself not appearing as a tax; if they had been duly informed of these facts, and had been possessed of but a very moderate portion of that sort of knowledge, which enables men to trace popular discontents to their real causes, they never would have entertained a hope of seeing a rebellion in France.

But, great as are the financial advantages of this commerce, Napoleon derives from it the still greater advantage attending such a *nursery of seamen*. It has been most clearly proved, over and over again, that, for *our* navy, the nursery is our *coasting* trade. There requires, therefore, no-

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thing more to satisfy us, that, from a coasting trade such as I have described, the advantage to Napoleon is so great as to excite well-grounded alarm in the mind of every reflecting Englishman. It is from this copious source, that the Emperor of France has drawn those hundreds of thousands of seamen, with whom he has manned his fleets and squadrons for many years past, and which fleets and squadrons, though always hitherto defeated, and, in many instances, captured and destroyed, by the superior skill and valour of your Majesty's fleets, answer the terrible purpose of causing us to keep up a force by land as well as sea so immense, so disproportionate to our population and our pecuniary means, that the country is stripped of its youth and its vigour, the fields are left to be tilled by the decrepid, and the taxes are so general and so heavy, and the anticipations upon them so large, that *hope*, which alleviates all other burthens, here refuses her sustaining hand. Year after year, we not only see the taxes and the tax-gatherers increase; we not only feel their immediate pressure, but, we see mortgaged, deeper and deeper, the very seeds of property; we see taken from us, for the purposes of current expence, that which was held out to us as the sure pledge of permanent relief. Could we once be sure, that it was out of the power of Napoleon to send a fleet to sea, how different would be our situation! But, this assurance we can never have, so long as he has the command of the seamen, necessarily employed in such a commerce. How often, within the last fifteen years, have we "*annihilated*" the navy of France; how often have we "*swept the ocean*:" but, still France, in the midst of all this annihilation, finds the means of sending out fresh squadrons and fleets; and proves, beyond a doubt, that she possesses, in spite of all we have hitherto done, the means of forming a navy in a very short space of time.

The parliament has recently been told, in your Majesty's name, that the aid you are giving to the enemies of France, upon the continent of Europe, is given with a view of keeping Napoleon from our own shores. The expressions are somewhat different, but, this is the substance, this is the real meaning of the words. Does it not, then, become me, if I have it in my power, to prove to you, that this is *not* the way to keep the conqueror from the shores of England? That this is a waste of our

means? That it has no other effect than that of augmenting at once our debts and our taxes, and of hastening the day, when the cries of the widow and the orphan shall proclaim, whether or not "a national debt be a national blessing?"

In *what way*, I should like to ask of your Majesty's servants, their subsidies to the enemies of France upon the continent are to keep Napoleon from our shores? Is it by giving him *employment* upon the continent? That, of course, must keep him from our shores for a *while*; but, the *possibility*, at least, is, that, by all the means we can contrive, by all the wars we can excite, and by all the treasure we can squander, he cannot, for any *long time*, be thus employed; and, consequently, when he can no longer be so employed, we, upon the very principle on which this aid is given to his enemies, must be in imminent danger. Therefore, by our present line of politics, by our present system of defence, by our present explicit avowal, if Napoleon succeed in subduing all his enemies upon the continent, we have very little hope of being able to resist him.

This, Sir, though neither very consoling nor very honourable to the country, is the conclusion to be drawn from the declarations as well as the acts of your Majesty's servants, who appear to have given up all hope of England being able, if left to herself, to provide even for her safety, leaving her honour totally out of the question. And this opinion is, indeed, very reasonable, upon the supposition, that the present is the only system of naval warfare that can be adopted. Upon the supposition, that we have it not in our power to prevent Napoleon from carrying on an uninterrupted exchange of products, the most valuable of all commerce, between all the countries from Naples to Marseilles, and from Bayonne to Hamburgh; that we are unable to prevent him from connecting all these countries, and consolidating them under his sway, by ties of convenience and of interest as well as by the power of his arms and of his civil and political establishments; that we are unable, with all our endless list of ships, to counteract the operations of signal posts, defended each by a couple of invalids; that, in spite of all we are able to do, France will teem with seamen, naval stores, and all the means of speedily creating a navy: Upon *this supposition*, it is, indeed, perfectly reasonable to conclude, that, when Napoleon has put down all his enemies upon the conti-

ment, when he has removed the possibility of there meeting with further hostility excited by our gold, *we ourselves shall be unable to resist his power for any great length of time.* Upon such a supposition, this conclusion is natural; but, as I think I shall be able to shew, in my next letter, such a supposition is not founded in truth, and that we *have the ability* to do with respect to the commerce of France, with respect to that fruitful source of power to her and of danger to us; that we have the ability to do all those things, which are necessary to our safety, permanent as well as present, and with a comparatively small portion of expence.

When one looks at the navy of England; at the quarter of a million of people whom, in various ways it employs; at the fifteen or seventeen millions of money (a *fifth* part, I believe, of the *rental of the whole kingdom*) that it annually costs; when one looks at this wonderful power, this mass of means, this focus of the fertility of our soil and of the industry, ingenuity, valour, and patriotism of the nation; when one contemplates all this, and reads the history of the war, for several years past, one cannot help being struck with the disparity between the means and the effect. For *what purpose* are all this preparation and all the sacrifices which it occasions? What does this immense navy *accomplish*? If, for many years past, all its prizes and all the mischief it has done to the enemy were estimated, they would not amount to enough to pay the expences of finding the navy in *water*. The navy is *our defence*, it may be said; but, that cannot be said, without acknowledging, that we are deficient either in the strength or the courage or the will to defend our country by land. As the means of *mere defence*, either the army or the navy must be considered as superfluous, or else we acknowledge ourselves to be inferior to our enemy in point of valour, or of disposition to defend our country. To consider the navy as the means of mere defence, is, in fact, to acknowledge, at once, that Napoleon has it always in his power to put us to an expence of seventeen millions a year, without any other expence on his part than that of the paper and ink, composing a paragraph in one of his *Moniteurs*. The navy should be made the means of *attack*, the means of annoyance, the means of distress through the empire of our enemy. The taking or destroying of ships at sea, the capturing of colonies, will avail us

nothing, *while the ever-fertile source of naval power exists unhurt in the dominions of France.*

In war, as well as in every thing else, those difficulties and dangers, of which we can foresee *no end*, are most powerful in subduing the mind; in producing weariness, disgust, relaxation of efforts, and finally, a disposition to give up the contest. And, I beseech your Majesty to consider, what prospect there is, or can be, of an end to our difficulties and dangers, while Napoleon possesses, undisturbed, the means of building and manning fleets of ships of war, though England, at the same time, maintains a navy at the expence of seventeen millions a year; what prospect there can be of peace and safety to England, while France, insensible of the calamities, and almost of the existence, of war, is able to impose upon your Majesty's subjects burthens such as were never before heard of, and which, with the duration of war, must necessarily increase. To me, therefore, it appears evident, that unless our mode of warfare be changed; unless our immense means be made use of to annoy and distress the enemy, and particularly to cut off his naval resources, we shall fail in this contest, which is not only for honour but for independence.

The *facts* which I have stated, relative to the commerce carried on in the dominions of Napoleon, are stated upon *such authority*, that I have no scruple in vouching for their truth. So minute, indeed, is my information, that I could have named *times* and *places* and other particulars, in confirmation of every fact, relative to this commerce, that I have stated in general terms. That such a commerce, so extensive, so beneficial to the parties concerned in it, forming so complete a chain of connection between the several countries whose means Napoleon must wish to unite and bring under his controul, so fertile in all the means of restoring or creating a vast naval power; that such a commerce existed I know that the people of England could not have supposed possible, and I verily believe, that your Majesty's servants were, in this respect, little better informed than the nation at large; for, to believe otherwise would be to suppose them guilty of a heinous offence against their master as well as against his people. To believe, that they knew of the existence of a commerce, carried on in the dominions of Napoleon, and employing, perhaps, two hundred thousand mariners; to believe that they knew of the existence

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of such a commerce while they were congratulating us upon the annihilation of the maritime power of France, would be to accuse them of hypocrisy unparalleled in the history of human depravity. Of this knowledge, therefore, I acquit them, and shall be well satisfied, if they now, though late, adopt measures calculated to remove from us that danger, which, if their present system be adhered to, can, as far as I can perceive, never terminate but in the subjugation of our country, and, of course, in the subversion of your Majesty's throne.

In my next, I shall endeavour to shew, that the commerce of France *may be destroyed*, and, of course, that her vast means of creating a naval force, *may be cut off*. The real causes of the inefficiency of our navy, in this respect, will be found to lie much deeper than is generally imagined, and where, I am sure, your Majesty does not suspect, because, supported as your Majesty would be by the unanimous voice of your people, you possess the power of removing for ever the most mischievous of those causes. The war upon the continent *may* prove very embarrassing to Napoleon; it *may* produce his overthrow: but it *may* produce exactly contrary effects; it may not only relieve him from all those embarrassments which he has hitherto experienced, but may end in the complete overthrow of every thing that calls itself our friend. This accomplished, as far as relates to the East, how quickly will the wings of revenge, united with those of ambition, bear him to the South! And, if he once obtain secure possession of the whole of the coasts of Portugal and Spain, what, if we persevere in our present mode of warfare, is to prevent him from sitting himself quietly down, and seeing us exhaust ourselves, wear ourselves out, torment ourselves with continual alarm, while his dominions have only to support a flotilla at Boulogne and an army of England, at an expence, perhaps, not greater than that which we are put to for the maintenance of the Local Militia? Where, then, should we look for an *end* of our danger? There never more, while that state of things lasted, could be *peace*, united with *safety*, for England.

If this paper should (which I greatly doubt) reach the ear of your Majesty, I hope, that, by this concluding paragraph, I shall prevail upon you to distrust those, who flatter you with the prospect of seeing the people of France revolt against their Emperor, to do which there has not

appeared, in any shape, the smallest inclination. I beseech your Majesty to consider, that all those persons, in France and her new dominions, who are now from twenty to forty years of age; that is to say, all that part of the population, which, in times of disturbance, decide the fate of governments, have been reared up in principles, which must make them hazard their lives a thousand times over, rather than see their country return to the ancient order of things; and that, supposing principle and prejudice to have no weight, still *self-interest*, that all-powerful stimulus, will never suffer a nation consisting, in great part, of those who are styled usurpers of the soil, to permit any thing which shall expose them to the chance, however small, of being ousted from their usurpations. I trust, therefore, that your Majesty will be induced to place no reliance upon any such events; and, of course, that you will be the more disposed to adopt such measures as shall tend to bring into fair operation the naval power of the country, and thereby to keep alive the hopes of your people. Hitherto there has always been some ground for hope, or the people have, at least, imagined such ground. But, if Austria should fall; and if, which would be the almost certain consequence, the Southern Peninsula should follow, where then, *if the means of suddenly forming a navy be still suffered to exist in France*, will be our ground of hope? The gloom of despair will pervade, and must pervade, the political horizon: to *submission* alone we can look for any alleviation of our burthens, and, though the thought will, at first, be accompanied with horror, to that submission we shall, in time, fashion our minds.

Such, sir, is my view of this subject. For the truth of my *facts*, I vouch with as much confidence as if they had come under my own eyes; and my reasoning upon them is, as I believe, correct. I have sometimes been wrong in my opinions, but I have much oftener been right; and, in this instance, the greatest favour I would presume to ask from your Majesty would be, that your *war-ministers*, by sea and land, should be called upon to prove the erroneousness either of my premises or my conclusions. The sending out of 40,000 men, the *selecting of proper persons to command them*, the planning of operations for such an army; all this is of great consequence in itself, but it is nothing at all when compared to the object which I

have submitted to the consideration of your Majesty; to the evil which I have pointed out, and to the remedy which I shall hereafter have the honour to submit.

I am, &c. &c. &c.
WM. COBBETT.

Botley, 13th July 1809.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

AUSTRIA.—Upon what grounds I know not, but it is certain, that an opinion is generally prevalent, that the emperor of Austria is getting the upperhand of his brother of France. The news-papers appear to be so full of this notion, and so gay and lively and even witty, upon the occasion, that I have been earnestly endeavouring to find out some reason for believing their hopes and expectations to be built on solid foundations. After long and diligent inquiry, however, I can find no such foundations. I still see Napoleon at Vienna, and I know, that, if he were in London, the wretches, who now pretend to believe, that he is in a state of disgrace, would lose not a moment in hastening to swear allegiance to him, or, if required, to his horse. How men are to be found impudent enough to argue, that merely because he lies in the capital of the country a month without making any great advances, he must, *therefore*, be in a fair way of being defeated, is sufficiently astonishing; but, how any body, any six people in the world, can be found to believe them, to look upon such reasoning as sound, surpasses one's utmost notions of credulity. Were I, indeed, to hear of his having actually *fallen back* some score or two of leagues, I should begin to listen to hopes of his final defeat; but, while I see him still in the capital of the Austrian empire, with a part of his army pushing on into Hungary, must I not be a beast to believe; to persuade myself, or to suffer others to persuade me, that he is in a fair way of being defeated, and driven back in disgrace? My decided opinion is, that Napoleon, so far from being upon the eve of a defeat, is upon the eve of totally annihilating the authority of the House of Austria; and this opinion is founded upon the same reasoning, whereon, if Napoleon were in London with a conquering army, I should be of opinion that he was upon the eve of totally annihilating the authority of the House of Brunswick. He *may* be defeated: his present situation

may be perilous; and the French fleet, when it comes out again, *may* beat the English fleet; but, as to likelihood, one is, at present, just as likely as the other. —If indeed, the philosophers, who conduct the Morning Post and the Courier, could assure me, and convince me of the truth of their assurances, that Buonaparté's army was officered with pimps, buffoons, bastards, harlot's bullies and brothers, uncles and cousins; if, indeed, they could prove to me, that Buonaparté did not look upon *brains* as being necessary in the composition of a general, and was content to take any creature that was brought to him, provided it had a pair of eyes just to keep itself out of the fire, and a hole in its face wherein to put victuals and drink; if they could prove to me, that Napoleon did not see with his own eyes, but with the eyes of that many-headed monster, his *Corps Legislatif*, who, by their deeds, have proved themselves to be the most stupid as well as the most corrupt assembly that has ever been heard of in the civilized world; if, indeed, Buonaparté were once to fall into the practice of suffering the high stations in his army to be filled up with the booby sons and other relations of these fellows, or of their wives and their mistresses, or, which would be more likely, by the paramours of their wives and mistresses; if I could be assured, that he had exchanged the Dukes of Rivoli, Dantzick, Abrantes, and the rest of his generals, for an equal number of besotted animals, one half of whose life has been spent over the bottle and the other half in bed; if I could be convinced, that his army was under the command of known, proven, notorious fools, and speculators, many of whom united the two characters in the same person, and who, on account of their ideocy, had a subaltern speculator sent with them to take care of their pillage; if, in short, I could be convinced, that, all of a sudden, the character of Napoleon's army was totally changed, and, that, instead, of exciting fear in the enemies of France, it was become *formidable only to France herself*; if any thing like this, which goes almost beyond the bounds of imagination, could be proved to me to exist, then, indeed, I should begin to expect, in good earnest, to see Napoleon retreat in disgrace, and though pursued like a hare, bragging that his pursuer was afraid to face him, and, when caught, at last, and beaten to a mummy, I should expect to see him, by an impious mockery

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of religion, singing *Te Deum* for the victory he had gained. But, not being able to perceive any such change in the French army; seeing no proof, that the interest and honour of the French nation are likely to be sacrificed to the interests of any hungry individual or greedy family; seeing no proof that the war against Austria has been fomented and kept up for the purpose of providing for the relations of the *Corps Legislatif* or for those of any body else; not being able to perceive any change of this sort, and particularly not seeing the smallest symptom of the poisonous influence of that most corrupt assembly, the *Corps Legislatif*, I really do not, and cannot, see that there are any good grounds for believing, that the French army will, in the present case, be compelled to get off in disgrace, and that they will go skulking back to France, slipping in by half-dozens at a time, as the philosophers of the Morning Post seem to expect they will.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

AMERICA.

Washington, May 22.—EXTRA SESSION.—This day both Houses of Congress assembled in their respective chambers. In Senate twenty-one Members attended. In the Lower House, at the first call, 120 Members appeared.—General Varnum is re-elected Speaker.—

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.

At twelve o'clock, the President of the United States communicated, by Mr. Graham, the following Message to both Houses of Congress:—

Washington City, May 23.

Fellow Citizens of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives;—On this first occasion of meeting you, it affords me much satisfaction, to be able to communicate the commencement of a favourable change in our foreign relations; the critical state of which induced a Session of Congress at this period.—In consequence of the provisions of the Act interdicting commercial intercourse with Great Britain and France, our Ministers at London and Paris were, without delay, instructed to let it be understood by the French and British Governments, that the authority vested in the executive, to renew commercial intercourse with their respective nations, would be exercised in the case specified by that act.—Soon after these instructions were dispatched, it was

found that the British Government, anticipating, from early proceedings of Congress at their last Session, the state of our laws, which has had the effect of placing the two belligerent Powers on a footing of equal restrictions, and relying on the conciliatory disposition of the United States, had transmitted to their Legation here provisional instructions, not only to offer satisfaction for the attack on the frigate *Chesapeake*, and to make known the determination of his Britannic Majesty, to send an Envoy Extraordinary with powers to conclude a treaty on all points between the two countries; but moreover, to signify his willingness, in the mean time, to withdraw his Orders in Council, in the persuasion that the intercourse with Great Britain would be renewed on the part of the United States.—These steps of the British Government led to the correspondence and the proclamation now laid before you; by virtue of which, the commerce between the two countries will be renewable after the 10th day of June next.—Whilst I take pleasure in doing justice to the counsels of his Britannic Majesty, which, no longer adhering to the policy which made an abandonment by France, of her Decrees, a pre-requisite to a revocation of the British Orders, have substituted the amicable course which has issued thus happily; I cannot do less than refer to the proposal heretofore made on the part of the United States, embracing a like restoration of the suspended commerce, as a proof of the spirit of accommodation which has at no time been intermitted, and to the result which now calls for our congratulations as corroborating the principles by which the public councils have been guided during a period of the most trying embarrassments.—The discontinuance of the British Orders as they respect the United States, having been thus arranged, a communication of the event has been forwarded, in one of our public vessels, to our Minister Plenipotentiary at Paris, with instructions to avail himself of the important addition thereby made, to the considerations which press on the justice of the French Government a revocation of its Decrees, or such a modification of them, as they shall cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States.—The revision of our commercial laws, proper to adapt them to the arrangement which has taken place with Great Britain, will doubtless engage the early attention of Congress. It will be worthy, at the same time, of

their just and provident care, to make such further alterations in the laws, as will more especially protect and foster the several branches of manufacture which have been recently instituted or extended by the laudable exertions of our citizens.—It will rest with the judgment of Congress to decide how far the change in our external prospects may authorise any modifications of the laws relating to the army and navy establishments.—The works of defence for our sea-port towns and harbours have proceeded with as much activity as the season of the year and other circumstances would admit. It is necessary, however, to state, that the appropriations hitherto made being found to be deficient, a farther provision will claim the early consideration of Congress.—The whole of the eight per cent. stock remaining due by the United States, amounting to 5,300,000 dollars, had been reimbursed on the last day of the year 1808. And on the 1st day of April last, the sum in the Treasury exceeded nine and a half millions of dollars. This, together with the receipts of the current year, on account of former Revenue bonds, will probably be nearly, if not altogether sufficient, to defray the expences of the year. But the suspension of exports and the consequent decrease of importations, during the last twelve months, will necessarily cause a great diminution in the receipts of the year 1810. After that year, should our foreign relations be undisturbed, the revenue will again be more than commensurate to all the expenditures.—Under the existing aspect of our affairs, I have thought it not inconsistent with a just precaution, to have the gun-boats, with the exception of those at New Orleans, placed in a situation incurring no expence beyond that requisite for their preservation, and conveniency for future service; and to have the crews of those at New Orleans reduced to the number required for their navigation and safety.—I have thought also, that our citizens detached in quotas of militia, amounting to 100,000, under the Act of March 1808, might not improperly be relieved from the state in which they were held for immediate service. A discharge of them has been accordingly directed.—The progress made in raising and organizing the additional military force, for which provision was made by the Act of April, 1808, together with the disposition of the troops, will appear by a Report which the Secretary of War is preparing, and which

will be laid before you.—Of the additional frigates required by an Act of the last Session to be fitted for actual service, two are in readiness, one nearly so, and the fourth is expected to be ready in the month of July. A Report which the Secretary of the Navy is preparing on the subject, to be laid before Congress, will shew, at the same time, the progress made in officering and manning these ships. It will shew also the degree in which the provisions of the Act relative to the other public armed vessels have been carried into effect.—Aware of the inconvenience of a protracted Session at the present season of the year, I forbear to call the attention of the Legislature to any matters not particularly urgent. It remains, therefore, only to assure you of the fidelity and alacrity with which I shall co-operate for the welfare and happiness of our country, and to pray that it may experience a continuance of the Divine blessings by which it has been so signally favoured.

(Signed) JAMES MADISON.

SWEDEN.—*Proclamation issued by the new King, on his ascending the Throne.*

We, Charles XIII. by the Grace of God, King of Sweden, &c. to all our faithful subjects, &c. &c. greeting.—When, under Divine Providence, we assumed some time ago, the Provisional Government of our beloved native country, committed to us by the States of our Realm, we immediately called the attention of the Diet to the indispensable and important task of framing a new Constitution, calculated to promote the prosperity, tranquillity, and welfare of the country, by an irrevocable union between the mutual rights and duties of the King and People of Sweden.—The States having informed us that they have not only performed the important task committed to them by us, and the confidence of their fellow subjects, but also that they have chosen us King of Sweden, and of the Goths and Vandals, requesting our approbation of that choice, the cordial and loyal manner in which that election was made, did not allow us to decline its acceptance. Relying on the Omnipotent, who explores the inmost recesses of the human heart, and knows the sincerity and purity of our sentiments, moved by the most fervent love and zeal for our native land, which can only cease with our existence, and trusting we shall be most powerfully supported by the loyal attach-

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ment of the noble Swedish nation, we have therefore accepted the Crown and Sceptre of Sweden.—It is far more gratifying to our feelings, to have been called upon by the free and uncontrouled voice of the people—to become their King, their Protector, and Defender, than if we had ascended the ancient Swedish Throne merely by right of Hereditary Succession. We shall govern the kingdom and people of Sweden, as an indulgent parent does his children; with implicit confidence in the honest; with forbearance towards those who err undeliberately; uprightness towards all; and when the day arrives, the near approach of which is announced by our advanced age, which shall put an end to our worldly cares, we will hail our last moments with the pious resignation of the just, and close it by blessing you all.

(Signed) CHARLES.

GUST. SUYDSJELKD, Aulic Chancellor.
Council Hall, Stockholm Castle,
June 6, 1809.

FRENCH ARMY IN AUSTRIA.—*Twenty-first Bulletin, dated Vienna, June 22.*

An aid-de-camp of prince Joseph Poniatowsky is arrived at the head-quarters of the army of the Grand Duchy. On the 10th of this month, prince Serge Galitzin, was to be at Lublin, and has advanced to Sandomir.—The enemy pleases himself in spreading ephemeral Bulletins, in which he always boasts of victory.—According to his account he took 20,000 muskets, and 2,000 cuirassiers in the battle of Essling. He says, that on the 21st and 22d he was master of the field of battle; he has caused to be printed, and circulated an engraving of that battle, in which we see him striding over both shores, and his batteries traversing the islands and the field of battle in every direction. He also imagines a battle which he calls the battle of Ketsee*, in which a number of French have been killed or taken. These childish reports, hawked about by small columns, like that of Schill, are tactics employed to unquiet and rouse the country.—General Marziarus, who was made prisoner in the battle of Raab, has arrived at the head quarters. He says, that since the battle of the Piave, the Archduke John has lost two-thirds of his army; that he afterwards

received recruits, which scarcely filled the vacancies, and who do not understand the use of arms.—He reckons the loss of the Archduke John, and Palatine, in the battle of the Raab, at 12,000 men. According to the report of the Hungarian prisoners, the Palatine was on that day the first to take to flight.—Some persons seem to wish to put in opposition the force of the Austrian army at Essling, estimated at 90,000 men, with the 80,000 men which have been made prisoners since the opening of the campaign!—They have shewn very little reflection. The Austrian army entered upon the campaign with nine corps of 40,000 men each; and they had in the interior, corps of recruits and landwehrs; so that Austria really had more than 400,000 men under arms.—From the battle of Abersberg, to the taking of Vienna, they reckon that in Italy and Poland we have taken 100,000 prisoners from the enemy, and he has lost 100,000 men in killed, deserted and dispersed. There still remains therefore to him, 200,000 men, distributed as follow:—The archduke John had, in the battle of Raab, 50,000 men. The principal Austrian army was, previous to the battle of Essling, 90,000 men. There remained 25,000 men with the Archduke Ferdinand at Warsaw, and 25,000 men were dispersed in the Tyrol and Croatia, and spread in bands on the confines of Bohemia.—The Austrian army at Essling, was composed of the first corps, commanded by gen. Bellegarde, the only one which had not been engaged, and which was still entire, and the wrecks of the 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th corps, which had been crushed in the preceding battles. If these corps had suffered no loss, and had united such as they were at the commencement of the campaign, they would have formed 240,000 men. The enemy had no more than 90,000 men; thus we see how enormous the losses are which they have suffered.—When the Archduke John entered on the campaign, his army was composed of the 8th and 9th corps amounting to 80,000 men. At Raab he had only 50,000. But in these 50,000 were comprised 15,000 Hungarians of the insurrection. His loss was therefore really 45,000 men. The Archduke Ferdinand entered Warsaw, with the 7th corps, consisting of 40,000 men. He is reduced to 25,000. His loss is therefore 15,000 men. We will see how these different calculations are made and verified.—The Viceroy has, with 30,000 French, beaten at Raab, 50,000 men. At

* Ketsee is situated on the right bank of the Danube, and a league in the interior.

Essling 90,000 men have been beaten and restrained by 30,000 French, who would have completely routed and destroyed them, if the carrying away of the bridges had not caused a want of ammunition.—The great efforts of Austria have been the result of paper money, and the resolution of the Austrian government to risk all. In the danger of bankruptcy, which would have brought about a revolution, she has preferred to add 500 millions to the mass of her paper money, and try a last effort to have it circulated through Germany, Italy, and Poland. It is very probable that this consideration has influenced, more than any other, her determinations.—Not a single regiment has been drawn from Spain, except the Imperial Guard.—Gen. count Lauriston continues the siege of Raab with the greatest activity: the town has been on fire for twenty four hours, and this army, which at Essling has gained so great a victory, that she took 20,000 muskets, and 2,000 cuirasses; that army which at Ketsee, killed so many, and made so many prisoners; that army which, according to its apocryphal Bulletins, has gained such great advantages at the battle of Raab, tranquilly sees its principal places besieged and burnt, Hungary inundated by parties, and to save its empress, its dicastus, all the precious effects of government, have removed them to the frontiers of Turkey, and to the utmost extremity of Europe.—An Austrian major had the temerity to cross the Danube at the mouth of the Marck, in two boats. Gen. Villy Vieux met him with some companies, drove him into the water, and made 40 prisoners.

*Twenty-second Bulletin, dated Vienna,
June 24.*

Raab has capitulated. This city forms an excellent position in the centre of Hungary; it is defended by bastions; its ditches are full of water, and an inundation covers a part of it. It is situated at the confluence of three rivers; it resembles, on a small scale, the reduction of the grand entrenched camp, where the enemy hoped to assemble and exercise the Hungarian insurrection, and where he had constructed immense works. The garrison, 1,800 strong, was insufficient. The enemy intended to have left 5,000 men, but by the battle of Raab, his army was separated from that place. The city has suffered considerably from a bombardment of eight days, which has destroyed its finest edi-

fices; all that could be said as to the inutility of a defence was ineffectual: it was misled by the hope of being relieved.—Count Metternich, after having remained three days at the advanced posts, is returned to Vienna. The secretary of embassy, Dudon, and the persons attached to the allied legations who had not withdrawn previous to the capture of Vienna, were set free on the confines of Hungary, when intelligence of the loss of the battle of Raab reached Buda.—Two battalions of landwehr, two squadrons of uhlans, and one battalion of troops of the line, forming together 2,500 men, have entered Bayreuth. They have, as usual, distributed proclamations, and endeavoured to excite insurrections. At the same time, general Amende entered Dresden with three battalions of the line, three battalions of landwehr, and a collection of men raised by the duke of Brunswick, and some squadrons of cavalry drawn from different corps, forming in the whole from 7 to 8,000 men.—The king of Westphalia has joined the 10th corps, and is on his march. The duke of Valmy has put in motion the advanced guard of the army of reserve which he commanded.

[Here follows the capitulation of Raab, consisting of eleven articles, dated 22nd June, by which it is agreed, that the garrison shall march out with the honours of war, and deposit their arms on the glacis, if not relieved by 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the 24th; they are afterwards to proceed to Comorn, and are not to serve against France or her allies during the war, or till regularly exchanged; the officers to retain their horses and swords, and the soldiers their knapsacks.

(Signed) MERGEZ, Adj. Commandante.
DORRE, Major.

(Approved) LAURISTON.

Ditto PECHY, Col. Com. of Raab.]

*FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN.—Bulletin, dated
Paris, June 29.*

The necessity of investing Girona, and afterwards covering the operations of the siege of that place, had obliged the seventh corps to draw near to it. At the same time the third corps had detached one of its divisions for the purpose of co-operating in the enterprise against the Asturias, and gen. Suchet, who commands it, thought proper to concentrate the remainder of his troops in the vicinity of Saragossa, along the Huerba, and on the Gallego.—

The Spanish gen. Blake thought it a favourable moment to make a movement on the side of Arragon, and having united his troops with a great number of armed peasants, he began his march on the 13th June towards the Huerba, and the same day made several attempts against different points, without success. On the 15th he advanced in considerable force on the side of Santa Fe, where gen. Suchet had collected about 6,000 men, and expected that the enemy, emboldened by his apparent inactivity, would push forward into the plain, and afford an opportunity of attack.—After several movements on both sides, gen. Suchet was enabled to make a decisive attack about five o'clock in the evening. It was attended with the desired success; and the enemy's line, broken in all points, was completely routed. The pursuit of the cavalry was rapid, and those who escaped were indebted for their safety to the rocky mountains, to which they fled for refuge.—The results of the action were, at the departure of the courier, 20 pieces of cannon, with their caissons, three standards, and upwards of one hundred horses; a general of cavalry, three colonels, five lieutenant-colonels, two captains, and more than 400 men were taken prisoners. The enemy left 3,000 dead on the field of battle, and fled in the greatest disorder. The most complete tranquillity prevailed in Saragossa during the battle; and gen. Suchet speaks in high terms of the conduct of the inhabitants of that city.

SPAIN.—From the *London Gazette*, July 8.—
Letters from Capt. Hotham to Adm. Lord Gambier, dated from the 22nd to the 30th June.

In consequence of the defeat sustained by the enemy's army under marshal Ney in the action against the Spanish forces at the bridge of Payo, that general fell back on Corunna on the 13th June, and immediately began to take measures for relinquishing the position of that place and Ferrol, removing his forces by divisions to an encampment three leagues in advance from Betanzos towards Lugo. The last divisions of the French left Ferrol on the 21st, and Corunna on the 22nd, after having in both places spiked the guns and destroyed the defences on the land side, together with the magazines and stores of every kind, and completely disarmed the places and their inhabitants.—The proxi-

mity of the enemy's position continuing to hold the authorities established by the French at Corunna in subjection through the fear of his return, no communication being suffered with the British ships but by flag of truce, and the state of defence in which the batteries and lines on the sea side were left, rendering it dangerous for the British to land or approach the coast in the event of the re-appearance of any of the enemy, capt. Hotham, on the 24th, ordered a detachment of seamen and marines to land, disable the guns on the different batteries bearing on the anchorage, offering, at the same time, to the governor the services of the detachment in rendering any assistance that might be in its power to the cause of the Spanish Patriots. The cannons and mortars on the sea lines at Corunna, and in the forts commanding the bay, were accordingly dismounted on the same day, leaving untouched those on the lines towards the land which had been spiked by the enemy.

—On the 26th capt. Hotham sent capt. Parker, of his majesty's ship *Amazon*, to Ferrol, where he was received by the people with the loudest acclamations of joy, and received from the higher orders of the inhabitants the strongest possible marks of attachment to the English, and happiness at seeing once more amongst them an officer of that nation. The castle of San Felipe, however, was still under the command of a person appointed by marshal Ney, and attached to the French interest, with a garrison composed of a detachment of a legion, raised by the enemy during their possession of Ferrol and Corunna; and on the 27th capt. Hotham received information that the above commandant had given orders to fire on any English ships or boats that might attempt to pass the castle. In consequence, capt. Hotham repaired to Ferrol in the *Defiance*, and landed the marines of that ship and the *Amazon*, with a party of armed seamen, under the direction of capt. Parker, who entered the castle without opposition, preceded by a flag bearing the name of king Ferdinand VII. and the Spanish colours. The detachment then proceeded to the town of Ferrol, where it was received in the most affectionate manner by the inhabitants, and having arrested the commandant of the castle in the name of king Ferdinand, sent him on board the *Defiance*. The governor of Ferrol not having any means of garrisoning the castle, the guns in it were spiked, and the powder

removed to the arsenal, and the place left under the command of the former governor, who had been suspended by the enemy.—On the 28th, capt. Hotham entered the port of Corunna, where he was informed by the governor that he had received instructions from the marquis de la Romana, dated at Orense on the 27th, to proclaim his catholic majesty Ferdinand VII., with advice that he had dispatched a regiment from his army to attend the ceremony and garrison the place; the governor at the same time gave capt. Hotham assurances that the port was from that hour to be considered under the controul and authority of the lawful king of Spain; and the captain placed himself, and every assistance that the ships under his orders might be able to afford, at the governor's disposal.—On the 29th, major-gen. the conde de Norona, capt.-gen. of Galicia, arrived at Corunna from St. Jago, and was followed on the next day by gen. Carrera with about 11,000 men, forming the Conde's division of the marquis Romana's army.—The French army under marshal Ney, moved from its camp near Betanzos on the 22nd, taking the road to Lugo and Astorga. It was reported, previously to its breaking up the camp, it destroyed its baggage and heavy artillery.—On the 27th the marquis de la Romana was stated to be at Orense with gen. Mahi and 30,000 men.—Marshal Soult's position on the 16th was said to have been at Monforte and Quiraga.

Letter from Capt. McKinley to the hon. W. W. Pole, dated Lively, Vigo, June 2.

Sir; I have the honour of inclosing to you, for the information of my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, a Copy of a Letter I received from brigadier-general Carrera, commanding a division of loyal Spanish troops, giving an account of his taking from the French the city of St. Jago Compostella; by which their lordships will see the spirit and gallantry of the brigadier-general, and the ardour of the troops under his orders.—I have the honor to be, &c. (Signed) GEO. MCKINLEY.

Head-quarters Santiago, May 23.

Santiago is in our possession:—the enemy, consisting of 3,000 infantry, with 14 pieces of artillery, and 300 horse, came out to meet us, and attacked us on our march in the plain called De la Estrella. Our scouts having fallen in with their voltigeurs, and exchanged some firing,

brought me the information, and I ordered the division to form in the best position that could be taken. The enemy attacked with vigour, but were unable to gain the smallest advantage.—Our artillery was as good as their's was bad, not a man being wounded on our side by a cannon ball. After an hour's firing we became impatient of suffering it, and I ordered Don Pablo Murillo to charge them on their right flank, whilst I advanced in front with the three other columns. The enemy twice took up positions, and were as often dislodged. The unevenness of the ground favoured their escape; in effecting which they shamefully blew up two ammunition chests; two others, with two of clothing, upwards of 600 muskets, and some horses and other articles, which I have not yet examined, fell into our hands. Murillo entered the city, and pursued the enemy through the streets to the distance of more than a league from hence. I am not yet informed of the number of slain, nor of that of the prisoners, of whom there are many. The general, Maquian, has been severely wounded by two musket shot; the second in command was killed in the field, whose insignia have been brought to me by the soldiers. Our loss has been trifling; the troops are in high spirits, and I may expect much from them.—I am, &c.

MARTIN DE LA CARRERA.

AUSTRIA.—*Supplement to the London Gazette of the 11th July.*

Account of the BATTLE fought near ASPERN, on the March-field, on the 21st and 22d of May, between the Archduke Charles of Austria, Generalissimo of the Imperial Austrian Armies, and the Emperor Napoleon, Commander in Chief of the French and Allied Armies.

The Emperor Napoleon having, after some sanguinary engagements near Abensberg, Hausen and Dinzligen, in which the fortune of war favoured the Austrian arms so as to force the French garrison at Ratisbon to surrender, succeeded in cutting off the left wing of the Austrian army, and driving it back to Landshut, and afterwards in advancing by Eckmuhl with a superior corps of cavalry, taking the road of Eglofsheim, and forcing to retreat those Austrian corps that were posted on the heights of Leikepont and Talmessing, the Archduke on the 23d of April crossed the Danube near Ratisbon, and joined the corps of Bellegarde, who had opened the

campaign by several successful affairs in the Upper Palatinate, had reached Amberg, Neumarkt and Hemaun, and had by this time approached Stadt-am-Hof, in order to execute its immediate junction with the Archduke. The Emperor Napoleon ordered the bombardment of Ratisbon, occupied by a few battalions who were to cover the passage of the Danube. On the 23d in the evening he became master of it, and immediately hastened along the right bank of the Danube to enter the Austrian States, in order, as he openly declared, to dictate peace at Vienna. The Austrian army had taken a position near Cham, behind the river Regen, which was watched by some of the enemy's divisions, while the Emperor Napoleon called all his disposable troops, in forced marches, from the north of Germany to the Danube, and considerably reinforced his army with the troops of Wurtemberg, Hessa, Baden, and some time after with those of Saxony. Near Kirn and Nittenau, some affairs had happened between the out-posts, which, however, had no influence upon our armies. However easy it would have been for the Archduke to continue his offensive operations on the left bank of the Danube without any material resistance, and however gratifying it might have been to relieve provinces which were groaning beneath the pressure of foreign dominion; the preservation of his native land did not permit him to suffer the enemy to riot with impunity in the entrails of the monarchy, to give up the rich sources of its independence, and expose the welfare of the subject to the devastations of foreign conquerors. Those motives induced the Archduke to conduct his army to Bohemia, by the way of Klentsch and Neumarkt, to occupy the Bohemian forest with light troops and part of the militia, and to direct his march towards Budweis, where he arrived on the 3d of May, hoping to join near Lintz, his left wing, which had been separated from him, and which was under the command of lieut.-gen. baron Hiller. But the latter had been so closely pressed by the united force of the French armies, that, after several spirited engagements, and even after a brilliant affair, in which he had the advantage, near Neumarkt, and in which the troops achieved all that was possible against the disproportionate superiority of the enemy, he indeed was able to reach Lintz, but was incapable of crossing the Danube, and obliged to content himself with destroying the commu-

nication with the left bank, and taking up a position behind the Traun near Ebersberg. This was the occasion of an extremely murderous engagement, during which the enemy in storming the bridge lost near four thousand men: Ebersberg was set on fire, and lieut. gen. Hiller continued his retreat, till he got so much the start as to pass the Danube near Stain without being disturbed by the enemy, and to wait the approach of the Archduke, who, after having in vain attempted the junction of the army near Lintz, had marched from Budweis to Zwettel; still hoping, by a quick passage of the Danube, to arrest the enemy's progress towards the metropolis. Meanwhile a corps of Wurtembergers had advanced from Passau along both the shores of the Danube, had occupied Lintz and the bank opposite to it; had restored the bridge, and signalized itself by destroying the defenceless villages and castles which could not be protected by the small advanced guard proceeding by the side of the main army. The enemy, by marching through the valley of the Danube in the straightest line, had got so much ahead, that all hopes of coming up with him in front of Vienna vanished: still, however, if that city had been able to hold out for five days, it might have been relieved; and the Archduke resolved on venturing the utmost to rescue that good city, which, by the excellent disposition of its citizens, its faithful attachment to its sovereign, and its noble devotion, has raised to itself an eternal monument in the annals of Austria. All his plans were now directed towards gaining the bridges across the Danube near Vienna, and endeavouring to save the imperial residence by a combat under its very walls.—Vienna, formerly an important fortress, was in vain besieged by the Turks, and would even now, from the solidity of its ramparts, the strong profiles of its works, and the extensive system of its mines, be capable of making a protracted resistance, had not, for upwards of a century back, the luxury of a large metropolis, the wants of ease, the conflux of all the magnates in the empire, and the pomp of a splendid court, totally effaced every consideration of military defence. Palaces adorn the rampart, the casemates and ditches were converted into workshops of tradesmen, plantations mark the counter-scarpes of the fortress, and avenues of trees traverse the glacis, uniting the most beautiful suburbs in the world to the corps de la place.—

Although under such circumstances no obstinate resistance of the capital was to be expected, yet from the unexampled loyalty of the inhabitants it was confidently hoped that Vienna might for a few days serve as a tête-de-pont to cover the passage of the river; whence all preparations amounted to no more than to secure the place against a coup-de-main; and for this reason the Archduke had some time before directed field-marshal Hiller to send part of his corps along the right bank towards the capital, in the event of his (the Archduke's) passage to the left shore.—Field-marshal Hiller now received orders to burn the bridge near Stain in his rear, to leave a small corps of observation near Krems, to hasten by forced marches with the bulk of his army to the environs of Vienna, and, as circumstances would permit, by occupying the small islands, to keep up the communication with the city and the debouche across the bridges.—The army of the Archduke now advanced without interruption, by Neupolla, Horn, and Weikendorf upon Stockerau; and, in order to overawe such enterprizes as the enemy might project from the environs of Lintz, part of the corps of the general of artillery count Kollowrath, which till then had remained near Pilsen with a view to secure the North and West frontier of Bohemia, was ordered to march to Budweis.—Napoleon had used so much expedition on his march to Vienna, that on the 9th of May his advanced troops appeared on the glacis of the fortress, whence they were driven by some cannon shot. From three to four thousand regular troops, as many armed citizens, and some battalions of country militia, defended the city; ordnance of various calibre was placed upon the ramparts; the suburbs were abandoned on account of their great extent; and the numerous islands and low bushy ground behind the town were occupied by some light troops of the corps of Hiller as well as by militia.—The corps itself was posted on what is termed “the Point” on the left shore of the river, waiting the arrival of the army, which was advancing in haste.—The occupation of Vienna formed too essential a part in the extensive plans of the French Emperor; its conquest had been announced by him with too much confidence, and was of too great importance towards confirming the prejudice of his irresistible power, for him

not to employ every method of taking it before the assistance which was so near could arrive.—For the space of twenty-four hours the howitzers played upon the town: and though several houses were set on fire, the courage of the inhabitants remained unshaken. But a general devastation threatened their valuable property, and when at length the enemy, availing himself of the numerous craft which he found there, crossed the smaller branches of the Danube, dislodged the troops from the nearest islands, and menaced their communication with the left bank, the city was justified in capitulating, while the troops retreated by the great bridge of Tabor, which they afterwards set on fire.—The Archduke received this intelligence in head quarters, between Horn and Meissau, and though it was scarcely to be expected that this city, surrounded as it was, should continue its resistance, the Archduke proceeded on his march without interruption, flattering himself that he might be able to execute his favourite project by a bold attempt to pass the Danube near Vienna.—This city capitulated on the 13th of May, so that there was no farther occasion to expose the army to hazard by crossing the Danube, for which no sufficient preparation had been made, and which must have been effected in the face of the enemy, and under local circumstances of the greatest disadvantage. By the surrender of Vienna the army had also lost a point of support on which to rest its military operations.—In this situation of affairs the Archduke resolved to collect his army at the foot of the hill Bisamberg, and allow it a few days of rest, which, after so many forced marches, it urgently wanted. The cavalry, for the convenience of water, was posted along the Russ, a small rivulet, which is concealed by ground covered with bushes, and the advanced guards pushed forward to the Danube, in order to observe the movements of the enemy, and prevent his passing the river, which he had already attempted to do from Nussdorf, to what is called the Black Lake, but with so little success, that a battalion of his advanced guard was taken. The chain of the outposts extended on the left side as far as the March, and on the right to Krems; this place and Presburg were occupied by some battalions;

(*To be continued.*)